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Agenda
• Introductions
• Experiment Overview
• ISS Operations and Anomalies Summary
• Post-Flight Assessment Process and Findings
• Applicable Unique Hazard Reports   
• Conclusions and Lessons Learned
• Project Status
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BXF Project Team Post-Flight
ZIN Technologies 
William A. Sheredy Project Manager 
Prof. Jungho Kim Microheater Array Boiling Experiment (MABE) Principal Investigator
John B. McQuillen MABE Project Scientist
Prof. Vijay Dhir Nucleate Pool Boiling Experiment (NPBX) Principal Investigator
Dr. David F. Chao NPBX Project Scientist
ZIN Technologies Project Team (Post-Flight):
Raymond Pavlik ZIN Project Lead
Wendell Booth Lead Electrical Engineer
Kimesha Calaway Safety Engineer
Sarah Czerwien Operations Engineer
Jeff Eggers Lead Software Engineer
Chris Lant Optics Engineer  
Kevin Magee Lead Mechanical Engineer
Craig Totman Instrumentation
Russell Valentine Mechanical Engineer
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BXF in the MSG Engineering Unit at 
MSFC
Containment Vessel (CV)
HSC Processor
High Speed Camera (HSC)
Avionics Box (AB)
N t Sho  own:
Suction Cups
Hard Drives
CV Window Cover
HSC Mirror
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Internals of the BXF Containment 
Vessel
Additional components 
in the Fluid System:
Thermistors
Relief valve
Bellows
 
Pressure Transducers
External Flex Circuits
MABE Cooling Chamber
Boiling Chamber
Drive System (bellows)
Pumps
Heat Exchanger
Servo Motor (bellows)
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Test Chamber (top view)
Temperature
Probes
(6 places) Bulk Fluid  
(Cartridge) Heater
(3 places)
MABE Heater
NPBX Heater (bottom of TC)
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BXF Fluids Schematic
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Structural / Pressure System
 BXF utilizes the Level of Containment (LOC) approach 
• Three (3) levels of containment required for Catastrophic Hazard 
potential
• Test Chamber and associated plumbing
• Double sealed Containment Vessel
• Each layer to be functionally separate, independent and verifiable
• Individual levels are not fracture critical     
• Single-walled CV not considered a credible leak path (CLP)
• Plugs for compression-type fittings not considered a CLP
• Per JSC document ES4-02-050, in the LOC approach, no 
part/component is considered fracture-critical
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Safety Circuit
• If over temperature and/or overpressure occurs, power is removed from the BXF loads : 
bulk fluid heaters, NPBX Heater, cooling loop pumps, cooling loop solenoids, pressure 
control servo motor (bellows) and MABE Heaters.
• Two sets of sensors are used; Primary and Secondary Sets.
– Each Set Monitors:
• Test Chamber Bulk Fluid Temperature    
• Test Chamber Pressure
• Cooling Loop Pressure
• Signals from each set of sensors go through comparator circuits and “AND” gates.  The 
resulting signals along with the software input go through another “AND” gate.  
• If one of the inputs is not within the acceptable range, safety shutdown will occur (fail 
safe): the signal (status) is latched, and the electronic switches (MOSFETs) shut off the 
positive and negative legs of the circuits feeding the load devices A software input line on          .      
the safety circuit exists to shutdown the system in the event the software monitors an out of 
range condition for temperature or pressure. 
• If safety shutdown happens, the system can be reset through the BXF Ops ground interface.
• BXF Software can not override BXF hardware safety controls if a sensor output is out of 
range.
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Crew Involvement in Experiment 
Operations
• Configure MSG
• Install and set BXF and the TSH into the MSG         
• Camera Exchange
• Re-configure High Speed Camera (i.e.: MABE 2.7 mm to MABE 7mm) by 
change-out of lens and relocation of camera. There are two fixed camera             
positions.  The crew will not have to focus the lens.  MSG will be powered 
down. 
• Hard Drive and Video Tape exchanges
• Change out hard drives and video tapes as required.
• Removal of hardware upon completion of BXF testing
• Remove hardware from MSG and stow      
Once installed and configured, BXF is operated from the ground via uplinked commands 
that either initiate a test run or data downlink
The BXF investigation planned no on-orbit maintenance
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BXF ISS Operations and Anomalies 
Summary
• BXF was delivered to the ISS aboard ULF-5, which launched in February, 2011.
• Operations began on Tuesday March, 22.
• Week 1:  Hardware setup, functional and video checkout, MABE and NPBX heater 
h i ic aracter zat ons.
• Week 2 and Week 3:  MABE and NPBX test point operations were conducted.
• On Monday, April 11, during MABE science operations, anomalous pressure 
readings tripped the BXF safety circuit, halting operations.  Attempts to 
restart/reset/recycle BXF did not correct these readings and BXF was shut down           .
• By this point MABE completed 260 of 540 tests.  NPBX completed less than half of 
planned tests.
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Anomaly:  Data Plots
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Anomaly:  Data Plots
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Anomaly:  Data Plots
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BXF ISS Operations and Anomalies 
Summary
• Tuesday, April 12 – Tuesday, April 19:  The project team worked to understand the 
anomaly, identify troubleshooting activities and generate a troubleshooting plan.  
• Thursday, April 21:  A telecon was conducted with POIC Safety and the PSRP to 
discuss proposed troubleshooting.
– Concerns/Questions: 
• BXF trouble shooting would not involve performing any new 
operations/commands
Th l ti i l d i t bl h ti ld b t– e on y new opera on nvo ve  n rou e s oo ng wou  e o 
remove power to either 24 VDC Bus 1 or 24 VDC Bus 2 to determine 
if there was a short on either bus
• BXF would not violate any safety controls      
– Trouble shooting would not violate BXF safety controls
– A draft of the Troubleshooting Flow Chart was provided
– The OCR to conduct the troubleshooting was ultimately approved
15
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BXF ISS Operations and Anomalies 
Summary
• Monday, April 25:  An Engineering Review Board was held to review the on-
orbit troubleshooting plan.
• Wednesday, April 27:  On-orbit troubleshooting was performed, controlled from 
the ground.  Conclusions included:
– Anything connected to the 24VDC Bus 1 could not be used.
– Limited NPBX operations could still be performed with the 24 VDC Bus 1 
switched off.
• Friday, April 29:  Crew member inspects cable connections.  Tornados shut 
down Huntsville operations.
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BXF ISS Operations and Anomalies 
Summary
• Thursday, May 5:  An ERB was held to review the procedures for continued 
science testing and to assess the risks involved. 
• Monday, May 9 – Friday, May 13: Limited NPBX operations were performed.
• Friday, May 13:  BXF was removed from MSG and stowed.
• All used video tapes and hard drives were returned on ULF-6.
• BXF was returned to KSC on ULF-7 in July, 2011.
• A Post Flight Assessment Review (PFAR) was kicked off in July, 2011.  
• Starting at KSC and continuing at ZIN, BXF troubleshooting was performed 
di t l d d d t f th PFARaccor ng o p ans an  proce ures assesse  as par  o  e .
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BXF PFAR Review Process
• There were four meetings to complete the entire PFAR process. 
1. BXF PFAR Kickoff  - July 18, 2011
2. BXF Troubleshooting Plan Approval  - July 29, 2011
3. BXF Troubleshooting Plan Execution Summary and Findings – March 8, 
2012
4. BXF PFAR Closeout – April 5, 2012
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Investigation Plan
• Post-Flight activities were conducted per the BXF Post Flight Assessment 
Anomaly Investigation Plan, PLAN-0383.
• Prioritized Objectives (and the order in which they were completed):
1. Verify the post-anomaly pressure and temperature measurement 
accuracies of the Flight system (2)*     
2. Determine root cause of major ISS operations anomaly (4)
3. Determine cause of high dissolved gas concentration measurements (3)*
4 Determine cause of camera alignment problem (1)*.       
* These objectives and associated activities are not discussed in this 
presentation except as they may relate to the fluid toxicity issue          .
• Plans did not include repair of the flight system once the root cause of the 
anomaly was identified as BXF will not be flown again.          
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BXF Post Flight Assessment Anomaly 
Investigation Plan, PLAN-0383  
Activities related 
to the fluid toxicity 
issue
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BXF “Toxicity” Issue
• The working fluid used by BXF is perflouro-normal-hexane (PFNH); it has a Toxicity Rating of 0.
• The BXF Containment Vessel (CV) was designed with three Levels of Containment.
• One of the possible causes of the operational anomaly that was identified was that a bulk fluid heater                  
shorted.
• It was suggested that if a Bulk Fluid Heater became excessively hot, the fluid could produce a 
potentially toxic byproduct, PFIB; this concern was raised with the PFAR Board at the PFAR 
T bl h ti Pl A l M ti J l 29 2011rou es oo ng an pprova  ee ng on u y , . 
• Plans and procedures developed did not address handling/opening a system filled with a fluid that 
may contain a toxic byproduct.
• The project team needed to address this issue, particularly before opening the CV as part of 
troubleshooting activities; CV disassembly was scheduled to begin on 8/22/11.
• Steps were taken to determine if possibly contaminated fluid leaked from the fluids system (it 
didn’t), to determine if the fluid was contaminated with PFIB (it was) and to mitigate against 
exposure to the PFIB.     
• Ultimately, the fluids system was drained and containerized by ZIN and disposed of by a vendor 
arranged by GRC’s Hazardous Waste Management organization.  Representatives from Codes Q 
and D helped to assess the process and provided procedure review.  
S h d l i t > 3 th• c e u e mpac    mon s.
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Containment Vessel Gas Sampling
• Plan Change:  CV Gas Sampling added
• Rationale: Test gas of CV Interior for perfluoroisobutene (PFIB) and 
fl l h ( ) d i h lk l idper ouro-norma - exane  PFNH  ue to grow ng concern t at a Bu  F u  
Heater overheated and generated PFIB from the BXF Fluid
• PFIB - hazardous gas, Acceptable exposure limits of 10 ppb TWA
• Two samples taken from CV Interior Space      
• No HF or F2 detected, indicative that PFIB not present
• Some PFNH detected, but at very low levels (334 & 437 ppm)
– Attributable to low diffusion leakage    
• Carbon byproducts detected, indicative of a combustion event
It was concluded that the BXF Test Chamber was intact (first level of containment still 
in place) and that it was okay to proceed with disassembly of the CV             .
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Pre-Drain Fluid Sampling & Analysis
• Plan Change:  Fluid Sampling & 
Analysis added
– Rationale: Stronger evidence    
of an overheat condition, 
increasing concern that PFIB
was produced.
• Two samples taken of BXF Fluid    , 
1 sample analyzed for PFIB
• CONFIRMED!!!  90 ppm of PFIB 
detected in BXF Fluid; 
Acceptable Exposure Level (AEL)    
is 10 ppb TWA
• CV reassembled to reestablish 3 
levels of containment
• PFA Activities halted to 
determine how to proceed
Generation of PFIB in the fluid is 
indicative that the BXF Fluid (PFNH)      
was exposed to excessive temperatures 
long enough to cause molecular 
decomposition.
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Flight Hardware Drain / Fluid Disposal
• Plan Change:  Fluid Disposal added
– Rationale:  Dispose of the fluid due to discovery of hazardous PFIB
• Several courses of action considered
• Final Decision:  NASA Hazardous Waste Management organization to arrange for 
disposal after safe transfer of fluid from BXF hardware to disposal cylinders
D i f• ur ng trans er process
– Temperature and pressure measurements for better Dissolved Gas 
Concentration calculation
• Result: 870 ppm   
– Collection of any foreign object debris (FOD) present in fluid
2414 June 2012 BXF - PSRP TIM - Fluid Toxicity
Bulk Fluid Heater:  Extraction and 
Visual Inspection
• Bulk Fluid Heaters #2 & #3 (Cartridge Heater S/Ns 012 & 009, respectively)
– Discolored and blackened
Heater #2 more blackened than Heater #3–       
– Aside from discoloration, no other damage observed
• Bulk Fluid Heater #1 (Cartridge Heater S/N 010)
– Unable to extract through port fitting so entire port fitting removed to extract heater     ,        
– Extreme damage in two locations on heater sheath
– Incoloy 800 melted in both locations
– Brownish Magnesium Oxide and greenish Nickel-Chromium wiring visible
The damage of Bulk Fluid Heater #1 proves excessive temperatures were achieved on-orbit.
Heater Material Melting Point (°C)
Incoloy 800 1385
Magnesium Oxide 2800
Ni‐Cr Wire 1400
25
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Bulk Fluid Heater:  Extraction and 
Visual Inspection
Heater #2 Heater #3
Tip Detail
Heater #3
Heater #2
Tip Detail 2614 June 2012
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Bulk Fluid Heater:  Extraction and 
Visual Inspection
Heater #1 Heater #1
Heater #1Heater #1
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Bulk Fluid Heater:  Extraction and 
Visual Inspection
Top View of Experiment 
Chamber (Looking Down)
Fluid and Heater 
Entry
   
Cartridge Heater 
Mixing Duct
Port #3
(1 of 3)
Interior 
Channel
(0.25 DIA
x 4.0 LG)
Port #1
Port #2
Mixing Jet Exit
(0.100 DIA)
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Bulk Fluid Heater:  Extraction and 
Visual Inspection
• Heater Operating Conditions
– 60 W @ 24 VDC, 1/8” DIA x 6” LG,   ¼” No Heat Zone
Heat Flux ≈ 4 W/cm2–   
– ~0.04 L/min. flow over each heater at time of anomaly
• Fluid manufacturer 3M recommends heat flux of no more than 6-10 W/cm2
– If exceed “boiling is no longer stable a vapor blanket forms on the wire and the wire ,     ,       ,    
temperature skyrockets.”
– This is called exceeding the “critical heat flux,” and it leads to burnout of heating 
element.
Critical Heat Flux
T i l b iliyp ca  o ng curve 
with onset to “burnout 
point” or “boiling 
crisis”
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Bulk Fluid Heater:  Extraction and 
Visual Inspection
• Heater manufacturer Watlow examined discoloration and damage of heaters
– “All signs of failures appear to be from exposure to high temperature.” 
Heater #1: “Melting of sheath (insulation breakdown due to high temperature causing–              
an arc…)”
– Heater #2:  “Discoloration and oxidation with a shorted internal winding due to high 
temperature.”
– Possible causes:  “Watt density too high” and “Material flow issues - low flow, no flow, 
or pattern of flow not taking heat away.”
– Recommendation:  “Suggest you monitor the heater temperature and use a high-limit 
controller to shut the heater down to avoid overtemperature.”
Typical boiling curve 
with critical heat flux 
and boiling types
Film boiling completely 
blankets surface, insulating it 
and allowing only radiative
loss of heat.
Result: Surface temperature    
jumps enormously with little 
additional heat input.
30
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Bulk Fluid Heater:  Post-Extraction 
Resistance Check
• Bulk Fluid Heaters 2 & 3 (Cartridge Heater S/Ns 012 & 009, respectively)
– Results similar to those produced during 24VDC Bus 1 Component Resistance Check
Partial Shorts on Heater 2 to heater sheath but not the wiring shield–        ,     
– Heater 3 passed
• Bulk Fluid Heater 1 ( Cartridge Heater S/N 010)
– Erratic results, resistance values not stable
– Still evident in data that Heater 1 is bad
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Bulk Fluid Heater:  Heater Wiring 
Dissection
• Bulk Fluid Heater 2 (Cartridge Heater S/N 012)
– Observations nominal throughout all stages of dissection
– Heater resistance ≈ 9.63 Ω during dissection
– Partial shorts to heater sheath found:  ≈ 40 kΩ, consistent with prior investigation results
• Bulk Fluid Heater 1 (Cartridge Heater S/N 010)
– Shield fused to inner insulation sleeving at connector, could not pull shield back from connector
– Shield hardened, very tough and difficult to cut open
– Inner insulation sleeving carbonized near connector, crumbled apart
– Internal wire insulation blackened overall, but whitened over crimped area;  Exposed wire near connector.
– Connector melted, contacts completely encased, unable to extract
– Wiring separated from heater on its own (no cutting needed)
Heater sheath bent at weakened damaged area due to handling–          
– Heater Resistance not stable, varied greatly during dissection
– Heater Resistance at heater sheath = 7.08 Ω, stable
– Shorts found to heater sheath ≈ 8 Ω
– Wiring failed continuity measurements
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Applicable BXF Unique Hazard 
Reports
• BXF-01, Rupture/Leakage of the BXF Pressurized System:
– DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD:  Rupture of the BXF pressurized containment system leading to 
MSG damage (catastrophic) and test fluid leak with the potential impact on the ISS ECLSS  ,             
(critical). 
– Applicable HAZARD CAUSES:  
6.  BXF seal failure creates a leak path.
7.  Run-away BXF science and/or BXF bulk fluid heaters lead to test chamber over-pressure.
– HAZARD CONTROLS:  
6.  The BXF seals are designed to maintain containment.
7 1 Proper design of bulk fluid temperature control system which includes the redundant.         ,     
temperature sensors connected to BXF Shutdown Circuit to shut the experiment down if 
bulk fluid temperature exceeds 68C.  BXF Shutdown Circuit includes an inhibit in the 
ground/return leg.
7 2 P d i f b lk fl id t l t hi h i l d d d t t d.  roper es gn o  u  u  pressure con ro  sys em, w c  nc u es re un an  rans ucers 
connected to BXF Shutdown Circuit to shut the experiment down if bulk fluid pressure 
exceeds 3.25 atm.   BXF Shutdown Circuit includes an inhibit in the ground/return leg.
7.3 Proper software version is installed, which shuts the experiment down if bulk fluid 
temperature exceeds 66C and/or bulk fluid pressure exceeds 3.1 atm.
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Applicable BXF Unique Hazard 
Reports
• BXF-01, Rupture/Leakage of the BXF Pressurized System:
– Key Points:  
• The BXF CV maintained three levels of containment of the test fluid and decomposition              
products during and after the operations anomaly.
• The Safety Circuit initially tripped when a system pressure reading exceeded its limit.  
Erratic pressure readings at the time of the anomaly and immediately afterwards are not 
d d b i l dibl I i b li d h l i i b heeme  to e ent re y cre e.  t s e eve  t at a comp ex nteract on etween t e 
shorted cartridge heater and the electronics inside the Containment Vessel (CV) is the 
cause of these readings. 
• Bulk fluid temperatures did not rise significantly at the time of the anomaly and remained 
within limits of the Safety Circuit; the overheating that occurred was a localized.    
• The Safety Circuit functioned properly and did not allow reset while the erratic, out of 
limit pressure readings persisted.  
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Applicable BXF Unique Hazard 
Reports
• BXF-05, Use of Materials with Potential to Form Hazardous Pyrolysis Products in 
Habitable Environment:
– DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: Contamination of the ISS injury/illness to the       ,    
crew 
– HAZARD CAUSES:  Use of Perfluorohexane-based fluid of insufficient quality 
containing isomers that can form potentially hazardous pyrolysis products when in 
contact with the heated surfaces (such as the ISS TCCS) if fluid leakage occurs             .
(Note: Rupture/Leak of the BXF Pressurized System is covered by the Unique 
Hazard Report BXF-01)  
– HAZARD CONTROLS:  Use of non-toxic fluid, which does not contain 
undesirable impurities (isomers) to produce the potentially hazardous pyrolysis 
products. 
– Key Point: The temperatures that the fluid was exposed to during the course of the                
anomaly were much higher than previously deemed credible.   
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On-Orbit Anomaly Conclusions  
It can be concluded from the investigation results that Cartridge Heater S/N 010 (Bulk Fluid Heater 1) 
overheated.  The heater temperature had to have reached at least 1400°C in order to melt the Incoloy 800 
and NiCr materials of the heater.  The heat that was generated probably transferred via thermal conduction 
d th t id h t i i i th b d lt d b d th t Thown e car r ge ea er w r ng caus ng e urn an  me  amage o serve  near e connec or.  e 
burning and melting of the heater and its wiring led to the creation of an electrical short on 24VDC Bus 1.  
This short would have caused the 24VDC Bus 1 DC/DC converter to go into current limiting mode, reducing 
voltage output, while at the same time, causing higher than nominal current draw from MSG.
The investigation results also suggest that Cartridge Heater S/Ns 012 and 009 (Bulk Fluid Heaters 2 and 3                 , 
respectively) may have also overheated, or came close to doing so.
The manufacturers of the cartridge heaters and BXF Fluid (PFNH) were consulted to determine the possible 
reasons why the heaters overheated.  Reference the information located in Appendix B and Appendix C.  
The following is a list of the most likely causes.         
 Lack of direct heater temperature monitoring and control allowed overheating to occur.
 The dissipation heat flux of the heaters was close to the normal gravity critical heat flux of the fluid 
(4 W/cm2 vs. 6-10 W/cm2).
 Fluid flow rate may have been too low to carry heat away from the heaters.
 Microgravity may have inhibited convective removal of heat from the heaters.
One or more of the factors above contributed to a scenario in which nucleation boiling of the fluid may have 
been induced around the heaters.  In the case of Heater 1, this nucleation boiling may have progressed to 
film boiling, causing the heater to become completely enveloped in vapor.  The vapor, in turn, would have 
t d th l i l t d i ifi tl d d h t t f f th h t t th fl id Thi ldac e  as a erma  nsu a or an  s gn can y re uce  ea  rans er rom e ea er o e u .  s wou  
have caused the heater to enter into a “runaway” condition in which the heater temperature increases 
extremely rapidly.  The Bulk Fluid temperature sensors throughout the Test Chamber would not have 
detected this local temperature rise at the heater.
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BXF Lesson Learned
Title/Subject:
ISS Operations Anomaly
Abstract:
During operations on-board the ISS, the BXF experienced an anomaly that required a system 
shutdown. A work around to the anomaly was developed and operations continued at a 
reduced capability. The BXF system was returned to the ground for post flight assessment and 
t bl h ti A l i f l f th BXF fl id fl l h (PFNH)rou es oo ng. na ys s o  a samp e o  e  u  per ouro-norma - exane  
determined some of it decomposed due to exposure to very high temperatures creating the 
hazardous substance perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB). Testing and inspections determined the root 
cause to be excessive over heating of a Bulk Fluid Heater submersed in the fluid. The 
overheating was brought about by exceeding the critical heat flux of the heater.
Driving Event:
On April 11, 2011 (GMT 2011/101), the voltage on 24VDC Bus 1 dropped unexpectedly to about 
6V, and an off-nominal current was drawn from MSG.  This condition went unnoticed for 
approximately 8 minutes at which point a fluid loop pressure warning occurred.  The BXF 
system entered into safe mode and tripped the safety circuit to remove power from the heaters 
and motors.  It was observed that all pressure readings and some temperature readings were 
off-nominal.  Attempts were made to recover by resetting the embedded controllers (ECs), 
restarting the BXF software and cycling power to BXF All attempts failed The system was
37
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shutdown.
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BXF Lesson Learned
Lesson Learned:
There are multiple lessons learned for this driving event:
1. Extreme localized heating can occur without impacting the bulk fluid temperature of a fluid              
system.
2. Design electrical system so failed components can be isolated in order to maintain maximum 
capabilities in the event of a failure.
3. Experiment designs and test fluids must be thoroughly understood and all hazard scenarios and 
f il d i ti t d i d t t i t d d d i f ila ure mo es nves ga e  n or er o preven  un n en e  consequences ur ng a a ure.
4. Coordination between mechanical, thermal and electrical engineering is necessary to ensure that 
the power supply does not exceed some safe heat flux limit. 
Recommendation:
1 Measure heater temperatures directly and incorporate into control/protection circuit.         .
2. Individually fuse heaters and use independent controls to activate/deactivate them.
3. Better review of critical designs is required to ensure they function as intended and that 
appropriate hazard controls are included.
4. De-rate heaters (and other convective heat devices) from normal to microgravity operation.
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BXF Project Status
• All BXF post-flight assessment activities have been completed and documentation 
baselined.  Main documents:
BXF P t Fli ht A t I ti ti R t 60081 RPT 0402–  os - g  ssessmen  nves ga on epor , - -
– Lessons Learned Report, 60081-RPT-0403 → Documents 49 Lessons Learned in 
the disciplines of Engineering, Manufacturing, Safety & Mission Assurance, 
Science, Operations and Management.     
– Mission Summary Report, 60081-RPT-0404
• The BXF PFAR was completed on April 5, 2012.  The only go forward action was to 
conduct a TIM with the PSRP to discuss the fluid toxicity issue.
• BXF will not be flown again and all engineering activities have been concluded.  
• Lessons learned will be shared with the larger GRC community beginning with the 
Program Review Board and through the NASA lessons learned database as appropriate; 
specifically, lessons learned will be applied by projects using fluids in the same family 
with similar concerns about heater dry-out and/or fluid toxicity. 
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Fluid Toxicity – Relevance to Other 
Payloads in Development  
• The subject of fluid toxicity and the potential to create hazardous decomposition byproducts is 
relevant to other payloads that are in development and are using similar fluids.
• GRC Payloads:
– Zero Boil-Off Tank (ZBOT) Experiment:  
Description: A small-scale simulant-fluid ISS flight experiment to study storage tank            
pressurization (through heating) & pressure reduction through fluid mixing in microgravity; 
utilizes perfluoro-n-pentane (PnP), which has been rated as Tox 0 / Flam 0 by JSC Toxicology.
Status:  Engineering Model (EM) hardware has been developed and the project is working 
towards a Phase 0/1/2 Flight Safety Review in July/August 2012 and Critical Design Review in         ,      
September 2012.  
– Flow Boiling and Condensation Experiment (FBCE):
Objective: To develop an experimentally validated, gravity independent, mechanistic model for 
microgravity annular flow condensation and microgravity flow boiling critical heat flux. The 
test fluid planned is currently perflouro-normal-hexane (C6F14). 
Status: The experiment is in the requirements definition and engineering concept formulation            
stage. An Informal Design Review is scheduled for Dec 2012 and the Requirement Definition 
Review is scheduled for September 2013. 
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Fluid Toxicity – Relevance to Other 
Payloads in Development  
• JAXA is planning a flow boiling experiment using a perfluorohexane fluid.  The experiment is 
still in the definition stages.
• ESA is planning several phase change experiments for their Thermal Platform in the Fluids 
Science Laboratory in the Columbus module.  Several fluids are under consideration and are 
tailored to the type of experiment.  It is believed that these experiments are in the preliminary 
design stages.
• Note:  The JAXA and ESA payloads are not managed by GRC and the information presented is 
not directly provided by the Payload Developers      .
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Backup Charts
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BXF Capabilities
• Test fluid perflouro-normal-hexane (PFNH); Tox 0.
• Bulk Liquid Temperature 
• Range: 30 - 60ºC
• Test Chamber Pressure
• Range 0.6–2.6 atm 
• Video at Fixed Positions
• NPBX Heater – 2 Side Views of NTSC video at 30 frames per second (fps)
• 70 mm x 72 mm FOV 
• MABE Heater Arrays –
• 1 Side View of NTSC video at 30 fps, 40 mm x 40 mm FOV
• Bottom View (HSC) up to 500 fps,  512 x 512 resolution, 2000 Frame 
Acquisition
• Small array, 2.7 mm heater- 4 mm x 4 mm FOV
• Large array, 7 mm heater - 10 mm x 10 mm FOV
• Data Storage
• Removable 120 GByte Hard Drives
• Video Tapes (Analog & Digital)
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BXF Electrical Design Safety
(Presented at the NPBX Science Testing ERB, May 5, 2011)
• Circuit Protection consists of DC/DC converters/regulators (equipped with 
active shutdown circuitry), circuit breakers, and fuses.
• MSG has current limiting at 10A on the 120V
• A short circuit would cause the DC/DC converter/linear regulator to current 
li i b f h i fm t e ore t e respect ve use opens
• Upstream inhibit in the primary power connector (120 V)
• Max short current of NPBX heater is 10A,  max operating current 100% duty 
cycle is 1 28 A  .  
• Wire sizes selected such that the operating temperature limit for wire 
insulation will not be exceeded (200 °C wire de-rating values used)
• BXF hardware passed integrated bonding test with MSG       
• BXF hardware is grounded inside MSG
• BXF fluid, perflouro-normal-hexane , is rated 0 for tox and flammability.  In 
the event of an “overrun” condition by the NPBX heater, the fluid and heater 
are contained and inaccessible to the crew
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Project Correspondence with the  
Cartridge Heater Manufacturer   
Kevin,
The first thought of the temperature sensor was to have it imbedded internally within the heater. There are 3 types/locations, A, B, 
and C.
Type A is in the middle of the heater core and used to monitor the internal temperature of the heater. It is the best to monitor to 
maintain heater life and avoid it burning up.
Type B is located anywhere along the heater. It has a section of no-heat and is best used to actually monitor the part temperature that 
the heater is in contact with.
Type C is in the end of the heater on the opposite end of the lead wires. It is the best to monitor temperatures in applications where 
material flows past the end of the heater       .
Since your heater is 1/8", the only type available is C. The 1/4" and larger heaters permit all types A, B, & C to to used.
The hottest part of a heater left in air will be the middle. Unless you can use a type C (on the end) and correlate the temperature of 
the middle section, that leaves a surface mount sensor as the only option. Watlow makes a hose clamp style thermocouple, but 
unfortunately, not as small as 1/8". You would have to fabricate one yourself.
I would think that a standard 301 type thermocouple wire (20AWG w/fiberglass insulation good to 2200F) clamped onto the center 
of the heater would be best. However, by looking at the drawings, I don't the space permits that.
The Experiment Chamber drawing seems to show a tight fit between the heater and the bored hole, but I'm not sure how Heater #1 
could have blown apart if it was tightly nestled in a hole. Heaters #2 & #3 may not have burned up due to having a tighter hole and 
being able to transfer the heat more efficiently away from the heater.
After explaining all this to you and looking at everything, unfortunately I'm not quite sure how to fix the problem without 
redesigning the chamber to accommodate a thermocouple somehow.
At least now you know the options      .
Hope this helps.
Thanks,
Nick
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Acronyms & Abbreviations
A Amps
AB Avionics Box
AEL Acceptable Exposure Limit
atm Atmosphere
LG Length
LOC Level of Containment
MABE Micro Heater Array Boiling Experiment
MOSFET Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field-effect TransistorAWG American Wire Gage
BXF Boiling Experiment Facility
C Celsius
CLP Credible Leak Path
cm centimeter
CV Containment Vessel
    
MSG Microgravity Science Glovebox
Ni-Cr Nickel Chromium
NPBX Nucleate Pool Boiling Experiment
OCR Operations Change Review
ODIN Orbital Design Integration System 
DIA Diameter
EC Embedded Controller
E-Net Ethernet 
ESA European Space Agency
F2 Fluorine
Ops Operations
PFA Post Flight Assessment
PFA Post Flight Assessment Review
PFIB Perfluoroisobutylene
PFNH Perflouro Normal Hexane
PI P i i l I ti tFOD Foreign Object Debris
FOV Field of View
fps Frames per second
Gbytes GigaBytes
GRC NASA Glenn Research Center
r nc pa  nves ga or 
ppb Parts per billion
ppm Parts per million
POIC Payload Operations Integration Center
PSRP Payload Safety Review Panel
S/N Serial NumberGMT Greenich Mean Time
HSC High Speed Camera
HF Hydrogen Fluoride
ISS International Space Station
JAXA Japanese Space Agency
JSC NASA Johnson Space Center
 
TC Test Chamber
TCCS Trace Contaminant Control System
TIM Technical Interchange Meeting
TSH Triaxial Sensor Head
TWA Time Weighted Average
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KSC NASA Kennedy Space Center
L liters
ULF Utilization Flight
VDC Volts Direct Current
W Watts
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